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Marshall v Madison:  
  The Supreme Court and Original Intent, 1803-1835
1
 
 
  Gordon Lloyd    School of Public Policy 
  July 2003    Pepperdine University 
 
    I:  Thoughts on Original Intent 
This work was inspired, in part, by the exchange in 1985 between then Attorney General 
Edwin Meese and Associate Justice William Brennan.
2
  This exchange turned on the 
normative question:  Should the justices of the Supreme Court rely on “original intent” as 
the foundation for constitutional interpretation?  Or should they be free to interpret the 
Constitution in light of hermeneutical approaches created by current philosophies of law?  
The latter went by various appellations including non-originalism.
3
 What I found missing 
from the normative commentaries in the subsequent law school and political science 
literature generated by this debate, however, was a serious concern with 1) conceptual 
clarity and 2) empirical evidence.   
 
There are a number of ways to portray the hermeneutical debate.  It seemed to me then, 
and it still seems to me now, however, that the status of the American founding is central 
to understanding the debate and to choosing which of the approaches to endorse.  I 
suggest that originalism must appeal to original principles concerning constitutionalism, 
federalism, and republicanism as decisive and instructive, not just numerically weighty or 
rhetorically important.  Originalists, furthermore, should make a common sense attempt 
to apply the spirit of the American founding to current constitutional issues.  To that end, 
an appeal to the original records of debates and expositions is a critical component of 
originalism.  On the other hand, non-orginalism must remove the American founding, 
especially the contemporaneous expositions, from a privileged interpretative position on 
both intellectual and political grounds.  How is it possible, a non-orginalist must argue, to 
understand the intentions of diverse individuals who lived in the 18
th
 century?  How can 
we usefully perform mental autopsies on the dead minds of the founders?  Besides which, 
the argument must conclude, we, today, have a more relevant and superior understanding 
                                                 
1
 This is a revised version of a paper, with the same title, prepared for delivery at The 
University of London, 30 May 2003 as part of the Bicentennial Reconsideration of 
Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review. I want to thank Megan Craine for helping with 
the appendices and Suzie Tortell for technical advice.   
2
  See Jack N. Rakove, ed., Interpreting the Constitution:  The Debate Over Original 
Intent, North Eastern University Press, 1990, for a reproduction of the exchange. 
3
  The materials dealing with the issue of originalism and non-originalism are extensive 
and surprisingly repetitive. See, for example, Rakove above and also Jefferson Powell, 
“The Original Understanding of Original Intent, Harvard Law Review, 1985, Thomas 
Grey, “Do we have an Unwritten Constitution?”  Stanford Law Review, 1975, Earl 
Maltz, Boston University Law Review, 1983, Larry Simon, California Law Review, 
1985.   See also Harry V. Jaffa, Original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution:  A 
Disputed Question, Regnery Gateway, 1994. 
of constitutionalism, federalism, and republicanism.  Anyway, the Constitution belongs to 
the living generation of constitutional scholars and federal justices.
4
   
 
In pursuit of the factual record appropriate to the Meese-Brennan debate, I developed an 
empirical taxonomy of the Burger Court and, then, the Rehnquist Court.
5
  This approach 
was non-scientific by the standards of contemporary social science.  For example, I read 
every case by hand, rather than relying on a computer generated database that could be 
replicated by others. This initial inquiry produced a surprising result:  the Framers were 
cited more frequently than the literature encouraged this reader to expect and they were 
cited in cases deemed to be landmark by constitutional scholars.  As a consequence of 
this initial study, I decided to investigate “the whole story” of the Supreme Court and the 
Framers.  Thus I decided to begin at the beginning with the Marshall Court. 
 
There have been two published studies on the use of the Framers by the Marshall Court 
as part of larger studies of the Supreme Court in the nineteenth century.  The first was by 
Charles W. Pierson in 1925.  Without the assistance of a computer, he compiled a list of 
cases that cited The Federalist.  While this was a monumental accomplishment, Pierson 
did not provide a normative commentary on the usage.  Moreover, he limited the 
compilation to citations of The Federalist.  Jacobus tenBroek addressed these two 
limitations in series of five articles published in 1938-1939. He included, in addition to 
The Federalist, the use to which the justices put other contemporaneous expositions and 
he also provided a commentary.  His main conclusion was that the justices should not be 
citing the Framers and when they do it is simply for rhetorical purposes.
6
. 
 
Much has been written on the Marshall Court and it is beyond the scope of this essay to 
explore the merits and demerits of the numerous and various interpretations.
7
  What I 
focus on is this:  when I read the opinions of the Marshall Court, am I reading an 
exposition which takes its bearing from the American Founding or am I reading an 
interpretation which relies on a philosophy of jurisprudence that can be separated from 
the Founding?  Much twentieth century mainstream constitutional scholarship has been 
                                                 
4
 This is a composite argument drawn from the following sources mentioned above and in 
the appendices. 
5
 The initial research was conducted by Gordon Lloyd and Arthur Svenson in the 
early1990s with the assistance of two grants from The Haynes Foundation of Los 
Angeles, California.   
6
 Charles Pierson, Yale Law Review, 1925, and Jacobus.tenBroek, California Law 
Review, 1938-1939.  James G. Wilson, Brigham Young University Law Review, in 1985, 
brought Pierson‟s study into the twentieth century and confirmed, for the most part, 
tenBroek‟s conclusion.  See also Christopher Jennings‟s recent article in the Boston Law 
Review, 2002 which focuses on the use of Federalist 10 by the Supreme Court. 
7
 Among the many studies of Marshall that are frequently cited are:  Leonard Baker, John 
Marshall:  A Life in Law, Macmillan, 1974, John R. Cuneo, John Marshall, Judicial 
Statesman, McGraw, 1975, David Goldsmith Loth, Chief Justice: John Marshall and the 
Growth of the Republic, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1970, and Jean Edward Smith, 
John Marshall:  Definer of a Nation, H. Holt & Co., 1996. 
devoted to demonstrating that Marshall was a an astute politician who pulled one over on 
the Jeffersonian Republicans or that he “invented” judicial review and thus he established 
the judiciary as the sole interpreter of the meaning of the Constitution.  A central feature 
of the scholarship on the Framers and the Supreme Court is that justices through the ages 
have paid only lip service to the American Founding.  Accordingly, contemporary 
scholarship concludes that Marshall would invite justices to be non-originalists.  There 
has been a very respectable minority of scholars, however, who portray this Marshallian 
contribution to jurisprudence as mythological nonsense: If we let Marshall speak for 
himself, this contrary argument goes, and understand him as he understood him self, then 
we will discover a Marshallian originalism grounded in the principles of the Constitution 
and the political teaching of Locke and especially the Madison of The Federalist. 
8
 
 
The purposes of this essay are fourfold: 1) to provide a comprehensive account of the use 
of the Framers by the Marshall Court, 2) address the normative question of the 
attachment of the Marshall Court to the concept of Madisonian Originalism, 3) return 
form the empirical and normative journey to take another look at the Marbury decision 
and 4) provide a tentative assessment of the challenge of the respectable minority of 
scholars concerning the Marshallian myth.  An understanding of when and where the 
justices of any Supreme Court actually rely on the Framers is valuable in and of itself.  
But this is particularly important in the case of the Marshall Court because it was, in 
effect, the Framing Court, thus inviting subsequent generations to explore the linkage 
between the Framers of the Constitution and the Framers of the Supreme Court.  When it 
comes to the normative commentary, however, I will emphasize the usage of The 
Federalist and especially Madisonian Originalism because it is to such sources that the 
respectable minority basically appeal in their attempt to portray Marshall as an 
originalist.   What does rereading Marbury after the long journey reveal?  Does this case 
set the tone for an identifiable Marshallian jurisprudence, which is recognizable 
throughout the term?  Is it a “one-off” decision that is set to one side as the term unfolds? 
 
I read all 1208 cases of the Marshall Court for which the justices delivered an opinion. 
The Court disposed of an average of 35 cases a year, a light load compared to the150 a 
year under the Burger Court and the 80 a year decided by the Rehnquist Court.  I 
determined that109 of the Marshall Court cases, or roughly 10%, raised one or more 
constitutional issues. This number suggests that the Marshall Court, unlike the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts, wasn‟t consumed with constitutional questions.  Their ratio is in 
the 50% range. I concentrated my efforts on these 109 constitutional cases because 
references to the Framers only occur in constitutional cases.  Of the 109 constitutional 
cases, 33 made one or more references to the Framers of the Constitution. That‟s about 
30%.  The ratio is also approximately 30% for the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. 
                                                 
8
 Among this respectable minority are Robert K. Faulkner, The Jurisprudence of John 
Marshall, Princeton, N.J., 1968, R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of 
the Supreme Court, Louisiana State University Press, 2001, Christopher Wolfe, The Rise 
of Modern Judicial Review:  From Constitutional Interpretation to Judge-Made Law, 
New York, 1986, and Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review, 
University of Kansas Press, 1989. 
 To get a handle on the Marshall Court and original intent I suggest we create a 
Madisonian constitutional model with which to examine the decisions of the Marshall 
Court.  In Federalist 39, Madison stated, “a tribunal is clearly essential …to prevent an 
appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact.”  Let us assume that the tribunal he 
had in mind was the Supreme Court.  One task of a Madisonian Supreme Court, then, is 
to adjudicate boundary disputes between the federal government and the states in a 
system that is partly national and partly federal. Whether Madison initially wanted such a 
mixed system is not pertinent.  Another task of a Court opining in harmony with 
Madisonian Originalism would be to act as an “auxiliary precaution,” where appropriate, 
to help police boundary disputes between the Congress and the Executive without 
imposing its own will on the branches elected by the people and the states. An 
independent judiciary is central to Madisonian constitutionalism but that independence 
does not entail an independence from the majoritarian foundation of the regime. The key 
to Madisonian originalism, in short, is to prevent one level of government, or one branch 
of government, from claiming, “we live under a Constitution but the Constitution means 
what we say it means.”  
 
This claim, “that we live under a Constitution but the Constitution means what we say it 
means,” is central to the jurisprudence of non-originalism and goes to the heart of the 
American Founding, namely the validity of the distinction between a fundamental law, as 
manifested in the Constitution, and a statutory law passed by national or state legislatures 
and faithfully executed by the President or Governor. The collapse of such a distinction 
would mean an end to the Framers‟ understanding of constitutionalism, federalism and 
republicanism.  Central to Madisonian Originalism is that the meaning of the Framers‟s 
understanding is to be discovered in the decisions of the State Ratifying Conventions, the 
records of the Federal Convention and the First Congress, and such contemporaneous 
expositions as The Federalist.  Moreover, the Constitution requires a “liquidation of 
meaning” over time; put differently Madisonian originalism requires both “initial 
consent” and “recurring consent.”    
 
As a second way of trying to get a handle on the status of the American Founding, I 
decided to find out how, and where, and when, the American Founding made an 
appearance in judicial decisions.  I realize that we often process ideas and experiences 
from the past without making explicit references to when and how we were influenced by 
a former generation. Thus a justice may have so absorbed the thoughts and events of the 
American Founding generation that no citation is needed.  One might make such a claim, 
for example, for Marshall.  Nevertheless, I rejected this possibility and decided to identify 
the actual citation of the American Founding generation broadly understood as an 
important indicator of the presence of a decent respect for the opinions of the American 
Founders. The absence of such citation would suggest that the justices are operating 
outside, or at the margins, of an originalist framework. 
 
I propose that we ask the following questions to the Marshall Court.   Where do the 
justices turn for interpretive assistance when the language of the Constitution is unclear?  
And even when the language is clear, do they seek outside assistance?  Does Marshall 
stick to the language of the Constitution, or does seek outside assistance?  Did the 
Marshall Court rely on a philosophy of jurisprudence in addition to, or as a substitute for, 
other modes of interpretation?  What weight does Marshall place on contemporaneous 
expositions of the Constitution?  Does he think that justices should defer to the meaning 
provided by the original State Ratifying Conventions? What is the status of The 
Federalist at the Marshall Court?  Where do they stand on the doctrine of “recurring 
consent”?  Are Marshall and Madison on the same side of the interpretive debate or is it 
Marshall v. Madison? All of these questions actually boil down to this:  Is Marshallian 
Originalism and Madisonian Originalism in harmony or does the Marshallian variation 
lend aid and comfort to what has become known in the twentieth century as the 
jurisprudence of non-originalism? 
  
II The Framers and the Marshall Court:  The Empirical Record 
    
Appendix I 
Appendix I, column one shows the distribution of the 1208 cases by term.  The fewest 
number of total cases, 24, were disposed of in the initial1803 term and the most, 58, were 
decided in the penultimate1834 term. Clearly, the Marshall Court wasn‟t dealing with a 
litigious society nor was the Court particularly aggressive in seeking to hear cases.  
Column two provides a numerical list of the 109 constitutional cases by term. At least 
one constitutional case was decided on in every term; the most active constitutional terms 
were in 1827 and 1834 when the court heard 8 constitutional cases in each term. The final 
column shows the number of constitutional cases, by term, that cites the Framers of the 
Constitution.  I have called these Framer Cases.  Note that 7 of the 33 Framer Cases, or 
over 20%, occur in 1819 and 1820, and that of the 10 constitutional cases heard in those 
two years, 7, or 70% cited the Framers.  By contrast, in one third of the 32 years of the 
Marshall Court years, the Framers of the constitution made no appearance whatsoever.  
 
The Marshall Court, or the Framing Court, thus had a relatively low caseload of roughly 
35 opinions per year of which roughly 10% per year were constitutional cases and 30% 
of which cited the Framers.  The strongest relationship between constitutional cases and 
Framer Cases occurred in 1819 and 1820 when 70% of the cases cited the Framers. 
 
     Appendix II 
Appendix II is made up of four columns.  The 109 constitutional cases are listed by term, 
name, and citation in the first column.  The second column itemizes the specific 
constitutional issue(s) raised in the case.  For example, 57 out of 109 raise Article III 
issues, but only 3 out of 109 raise Article II questions.  Marbury raises both constitutional 
issues.   44 out of the109 deal with Article I matters, especially the powers of Congress 
(Section 8) and the limitations on the powers of the states (Section 10).  Column three 
indicates whether or not the Framers were cited in the case and specifies the source of the 
Framer citation.  Column four states which of the 109 cases are landmark cases. 
 
Drawing on my previous work with the Burger Court, I divided Framer references in 
column three into seven categories. 
9
 “CC” stands for a citation that refers to the work of 
the Constitutional Convention of 1787.  12 out of the 33 Framer cases refer to the 
Constitutional Convention and these citations are used overwhelmingly in opinions for 
the Court. “RC” indicates references to the debates of the State Ratifying Conventions.  
There are only 5 citations to these ratifying conventions: Marshall cited “RC” in 3 cases, 
each landmark cases, in writing the opinion of the court.  “IC” stands for citations from 
the First Congress.  This Congress proposed that a Bill of Rights be added to the 
Constitution and the members of that body also passed of the Judiciary Act that provided 
for the organization and powers of the Judiciary.  8 of the 33 cases cite the First 
Congress; 6 of them by Marshall in writing the opinion of the Court.  “OR” stands for 
references to such other figures of the founding generation as the Antifederalists, or for a 
citation of other founding documents, such as the Northwest Ordinance.  Only 2 cases use 
this form of citation:  Ogden v. Saunders and Wheaton v. Peters and neither citation is by 
Marshall.  (The “OR” citation has become much more prevalent in the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts.)  “DR” captures the extent to which the justices cite a precedent—that 
is when they make a decisis reference—that makes a specific reference to the Framers. 
The Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia is the lone “DR” citation:   (Twentieth 
century Supreme Courts, by contrast, rely heavily on the use of precedent to render 
decisions.) The sixth mode of citation, “FP,” represents citations of The Federalist.  11 of 
the 33 Framer references include one or more citations of The Federalist.  Finally, “GR” 
refers to generic references to the Framers as a coherent group whose views can be 
expressed without a citation of a specific source.  This mode is used in 25 of the 33 cases.  
 
Nine of the 109 are deemed to be landmark cases by 4 or more of selected textual 
sources. 
10
 Three receive that honor from all seven sources:  Marbury v. Madison, 
McCulloch v. Maryland, and Gibbons v. Ogden.  Accordingly, it seems sensible to pay 
closer attention to what these three cases have to teach us about the originalist non-
originalist debate.  However, Gibbons v. Ogden can be dispensed with rather easily.  
                                                 
9
 The Federalist category needs no explanation.  Following tenBroek, I have added the 
Constitutional Convention and the State Ratifying Conventions as contemporaneous 
sources to which justices might turn.  Anderson‟s contribution to the discussion in the 
1950s was to point out the extent to which the justices were inclined to cite the Framers, 
or some similar nomenclature, as a group.  Thus this category is included.  My recent 
work on the Supreme Court has indicated that the justices some times cite Other 
References, for example Thomas Jefferson and James Madison on the separation of 
church and state, and they sometimes cite one or more sources from the American 
Founding if that specific citation occurs in a previous decision.  I have added one more 
contemporaneous source, namely, the First Congress.    
10
 To decide which cases should be included in the landmark case category, I compiled a 
list of landmark cases identified by 6 prominent constitutional law texts and 1 
comprehensive documentary source.  (These sources are listed in Appendix II and 
include the work of David Currie, Ralph Rossum, John Cotton, Gerald Gunther, Harold 
Chase, and William Cohen.)  1 or more of the sources list 43 of the 109 constitutional 
cases as landmark status. 
There are no references to The Federalist in this 1824 decision, although both Marshall 
for the Court and Johnson concurring make a point of mentioning the work of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787.  Far more interesting to investigate than Gibbons are 
Fletcher v Peck, and Cohens v Virginia. 
 
     Appendix III 
What sort of citation distribution exists among the justices?  Do the citations occur more 
in Court opinions or in concurring or dissenting opinions?  In what kind of cases and 
controversies do the citations take place?  Are the citations usually, or rarely, found in 
landmark cases?  Appendix III answers these questions.  In column one, I list the 33 
Framer Cases by term.  In the remaining columns, I itemize the citation of the Framers by 
individual justices, indicate the type of Framer citation, and note whether or not the 
citation occurred as an opinion of the Court, a concurring opinion, or a dissenting opinion  
The Framers were cited in 32 of the 33 opinions of the Court, in 6 concurring opinions 
and in 9 dissenting opinions. The generic reference, “GR,” dominated the Framer citation 
mode for those justices who wrote the opinions of the Court.  Marshall wrote 24 of those 
opinions, and relied on “GR” on 19 occasions.  He cited The Federalist only three times, 
although never specifically by number.  Thompson wrote 5 of the dissenting opinions and 
cited The Federalist in four of his dissents.  In fact, “FP,” The Federalist, was the citation 
of choice—six out of the ten dissents cited The Federalist--by justices who wrote 
dissenting opinions! 
 
 III An Originalists’s Nightmare:  Commentary on the Post Marbury Court 
 
The empirical evidence raises the possibility of An Originalists‟s Nightmare, namely, 
having to choose between the originalism of The Federalist and the originalism of 
Marshall and perhaps waking up realizing that Marshallian Originalism “opens up the 
Constitution” to the jurisprudence of non-originalism rather than reinforcing Madisonian 
Originalism.  The central question in this section of the paper is what does the Marshall 
Court in general, and Marshall in particular, have to say, or not say, about the American 
Founding?  In particular when, where, and how do The Federalist and other 
contemporaneous sources appear in the actual content of the constitutional opinions? 
 
Robert Faulkner‟s 1968 publication has helped fix the relationship between Marshall and 
The Federalist.  It is a complete commentary on, and the finest exposition of, their 
relationship.  Faulkner‟s project is to locate Marshall as a constituent member of “the 
generation that framed the Constitution” and to portray a coherent and recoverable 
originalist jurisprudence that, in turn, is guided by the Lockean principles of the 
Madisonian commercial republic.  To that end, he states, “it is not open to question that 
The Federalist helped to fix Marshall‟s Constitutional constructions.”  To seal the 
connection between The Federalist and Marshall, Faulkner correctly observes that 
Marshall “was later to describe the work from the bench as „a complete commentary on 
our constitution,‟ always „considered as of great authority,‟ whose „intrinsic merit entitles 
it to this high rank.‟”  Marshall‟s endorsement of The Federalist as the authoritative text 
occurs in Cohens v. Virginia, 1821.  Faulkner, in a footnote, informs us that Marshall also 
cited The Federalist in McCullough.  He suggests, finally, that the compatibility between 
Marshall and Madison of The Federalist reaches the level of fundamental principle;  “In 
no way would Marshall have differed from Madison in Federalist X; the first object of 
government is the protection of the „different and unequal faculties of acquiring 
property.‟”  11  
 
The empirical evidence, however, raises some doubts about the smoothness of the 
relationship between The Federalist and Marshall. The relationship is made even more 
complicated by Marshall‟s defense of the interstate commerce clause and the obligation 
of contracts clause.  These seem, on the surface, so central to fulfilling the teachings of 
Federalist 10.  Yet not once does Marshall, in any of his decisions, cite an essay from 
Madison in The Federalist.   
    A:  Fletcher v. Peck 
Robert Fletcher, from New Hampshire, had purchased several thousand acres of land in 
Georgia from John Peck of Massachusetts.  At issue was whether the 1796 Georgia 
Rescinding Act, declaring the prior sale of the public land of Georgia land under a 1795 
Act, to be invalid.  It was passed because of the Georgia legislature found the presence of 
considerable fraud, bribery, and corruption.  But did this second act violate the Contract 
Clause of the Constitution which, under Article I, Section 10, prohibited the states from 
“impairing the obligation of contracts?”  There is sufficient evidence to suggest that 
political and economic speculations were driving the case from start to finish.
12
  Fletcher 
and Pack, for example, weren‟t really adversaries!  But I don‟t want to go down that 
political path.
13
  I‟m not interested in whether Marshall played “free and easy with the 
Framers‟ intent in order to rationalize and privatize the land market, and was he moved to 
do so by his long-running war with Virginia over his investment in the Fairfax lands?”14   
The important question for the orginalist debate is whether or not the Marshall Court‟s 
1810 decision to overturn the Georgia statute that attempted to regulate the economy 
                                                 
11
 Robert K. Faulkner, The Jurisprudence of John Marshall, See especially pages 5,19, 
117, and 150, Newmyer also places Marshall squarely within the tradition of the Framers, 
but by way of Hamilton.  Newmyer comments that William W. Crosskey‟s claim in 
Politics and the Constitution the History of the United States, University of Chicago, 
1953-1980, that “Marshall retreated from the unitary nationalism of the Framers is badly 
flawed…but his argument set me thinking.  What Crosskey treats as Marshall‟s deviation 
from constitutional truth, I tend to see as the essence of his constitutional jurisprudence—
and of his perceptive reading of the Framers‟ intent as well.”  P.493.  There is a strong 
tendency among what I have called the respectable minority to see the intent of the 
Framers as equivalent to the exposition of “unitary nationalism.” 
12
 See the commentary by Newmyer, pp.222-235. 
13
 Luther Martin represented Fletcher in the case and was so drunk, according to 
Newmyer, that Marshall “had to adjourn the Court until he sobered up.”  P.227.  Martin‟s 
insobriety was well known at the Constitutional Convention of 1787.  Martin was later to 
represent Maryland in the McCulloch case in 1819.   
14
 Newmyer, p.223. 
appealed to the principles of the American Founding concerning federalism and 
republicanism or whether his opinion played “free and easy with the Framers‟ intent,” 
period..  Fletcher was a controversial and “far-reaching” opinion—it was the first 
decision of the Supreme Court declaring an act of a state legislature unconstitutional-- in 
favor of the sanctity of the private contract between Fletcher and Peck.  It turned on 
Marshall‟s claim that Fletcher and Peck were innocent third parties.  Thus the issue was 
did the Georgia legislature violate the rule of law? Marshall‟s opinion was “yes.”  And in 
support of this opinion he made a generic reference to the Framers:  “Whatever respect 
might have been felt for the state sovereignties, it is not to be disguised that the Framers 
of the constitution viewed, with some apprehension, the violent acts which might grow 
out of the feelings of the moment; and that the people of the United States, in adopting 
that instrument, have manifested a determination to shield themselves and their property 
from the effects of those sudden and strong passions to which men are opposed.”  
Newmyer‟s ultimate assessment of whether Marshall played fast and loose with Framer 
Intent in this case is that he didn‟t.  According to Newmyer, Marshall „s decision 
“comported closely to the general, if not the explicit, intent of the Framers.  For him, as 
for them, private property and liberty were inseparable, and both were guaranteed by the 
common-law doctrine of contract, which now became a part of the Constitution.  In a 
manner of speaking, public law had been privatized.”15  
It is undoubtedly true, that Madison and the other Framers of Federalist persuasion were 
concerned that the individual right to private property was in danger from the tyrannical 
actions of the state legislatures.  Madison, in Federalist 10, for example, warned of the 
injustices created by the redistributive schemes of state legislators who passed legislation 
in favor of the many who were debtors over against the few who were creditors.  After 
all, the most common and durable source of faction is the question of the distribution of 
property and unless this question is resolved, the future of republicanism is in danger.   
Thus Madison called for an enlargement of the orbit of republican government and the 
ability of the general government to restrain the tyrannical behavior of state majorities.  
But the intention, and effect, of the policy of the Georgia legislature in 1796 was not 
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 Newmyer, p. 235.  Similarly in Ogden v. Saunders, Marshall stood ready to declare the 
act of New York under review to be “repugnant to the constitution of the United States.”  
He did not turn to The Federalist for assistance.  Instead he asserted, in terms reminiscent 
of Marbury, that “the mind of the Convention,” bestows on the Court the task “of 
preserving the constitution from legislative infraction.”  To that end, it is the duty of the 
justices to exercise “their best judgment.”  His fellow justices disagreed with him and 
urged a version of Madisonian Originalism.  Thompson, Johnson, Washington, and 
Trimble each wrote opinions for the Court.  Thompson observed that the accurate mode 
of constitutional interpretation was stated in Fletcher v. Peck. There, Thompson notes, the 
Court stated “whether a law be void for its repugnancy to the constitution, is, at all times, 
a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom or ever to be decided in a doubtful 
case.”   Marshall dissented from this moderate Madisonian constitutionalism in Ogden 
and, intentionally or not, leaves this reader with the impression that the Constitution 
means what the justices say it means. 
tyrannical; rather the objective was to overcome the injustice that a previous state 
legislature had rendered to the moral presuppositions of a capitalist order.  
On Madisonian Originalist grounds, there was no need for a correction by the central 
government in general, or the Supreme Court in particular.  The case for Madisonian 
“market capitalism” is that exchanges be free of force and fraud and the case for private 
property is grounded in the idea that privatization is a reward for the exercise of the 
unequal faculties of acquiring property.  Newmyer, discussing Marshall‟s only dissenting 
opinion of the Supreme Court, which occurred in Ogden v. Saunders, 1827, says that he 
did so because he thought his fellow justices had abandoned the relationship between 
capitalism and morality and he is certainly correct to suggest that Marshall “would have 
been mystified by the tendency of some recent scholars to separate liberal capitalism and 
republican morality.”16  But in Fletcher, Marshall certainly stretches the relationship 
between liberal capitalism and republican morality. 
Fletcher is also important because it was the first time the Marshall Court cited The 
Federalist.  But it was not Marshall doing the citing.  As we have seen, Marshall cited a 
“GR,” not The Federalist, to support his position that the obligation of contracts must be 
honored.   Justice William Johnson concurred with decision, but had serious reservations 
about Marshall‟s opinion because it restrained the reach of state sovereignty in correcting 
previous legislative corruption.  Johnson, in effect, questioned Marshall‟s claim that the 
Framers would agree completely with his opinion.  He cites The Federalist:  “There is 
reason to believe, from the letters of Publius, which are well-known to be entitled to the 
highest respect, that the object of the convention was to afford a general protection to 
individual rights against the acts of the state legislatures.  Whether the words, 'acts 
impairing the obligation of contracts,' can be construed to have the same force as must 
have been given to the words 'obligation and effect of contracts,' is the difficulty in my 
mind.”  
For the first seven years of the Marshall Court, The Federalist was not cited and when it 
was first cited, it was cited, not by Marshall for the Court on behalf of “democratic 
capitalism,” but by Johnson in “an opinion different from that which has been delivered 
by the court.” 
    B:  McCulloch v. Maryland 
Marshall‟s first citation of The Federalist occurred in McCulloch v. Maryland, 1819, one 
of our three super landmark cases.  The state legislature of Maryland had imposed a tax 
on the Second Bank of the United States, and McCulloch, a cashier at the Bank, refused 
to the pay the tax.  Did Congress have the authority to incorporate a national bank, and 
could Maryland tax the bank?  Marshall said, “yes” to the first question and “no” to the 
second question.  He states that “the Framers of the American Constitution” outlined the 
important general objectives to be attained, rather than the “minor ingredients” to be 
followed. “The language” of the Constitution proves this, says Marshall.  Accordingly, it 
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is not a specific statute but “a Constitution we are expounding.”   Marshall refers to no 
contemporaneous exposition to support his “expounding” of the interstate commerce 
clause and its relationship to the necessary and proper clause.  To be sure, he summarizes 
Hamilton‟s remarks, without attribution, from Federalist 33 and 34, to show that the 
Attorney General of Maryland, Luther Martin, misinterprets the American Founding.  But 
he uses Hamilton‟s doctrine of concurrent powers in a very Madisonian way. According 
to Marshall,  “under such assurances from those who made, who recommended, and 
carried, the constitution, and who were supposed best to understand it, was it received 
and adopted by the people of these United States; and now, after a lapse of nearly thirty 
years, they are to be informed, [by Mr. Martin] that all this is a mistake.”  This is 
Madisonian Originalism at its clearest:  Marshall‟s argument is a suggestive appeal to 
Madison‟s “recurring consent” concept of originalist jurisprudence.  
 Marshall had the opportunity to drive home the compatibility between the Framing Court 
and The Federalist with respect to the powers of Congress but he didn‟t: 
In the course of the argument The Federalist has been quoted; and the 
opinions expressed by the authors of that work have been justly supposed 
to be entitled to great respect in expounding the constitution.  No tribute 
can be paid to them that exceeds their merit; but in applying their opinions 
to the cases which may arise in the progress of our government, a right to 
judge of their correctness must be retained; and to understand the 
argument, we must examine the proposition it maintains, and the 
objections against which it is directed.  (Emphasis added.) 
Isn‟t Marshall saying that despite the respect owed to The Federalist, when it comes to  
“expounding the constitution,” those authors may be incorrect? And is not Marshall also 
saying that it is “the right” of the Court to determine the meaning of the Constitution?  
Moreover, we are left wondering about the origin of his understanding of “the necessary 
and proper clause” If the following loose and bold construction has any roots in the 
American founding then it is Hamiltonian and not Madisonian:  “Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but 
consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.”  Not 
surprisingly, Marshall does not cite the Framers in support of this interpretation.
17
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 The decision caused a considerable controversy in Virginia.  R. Kent Newmyer, John 
Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court, Louisiana State University Press, 
2001, summarizes the “vehement, comprehensive, and long-lasting” attack on the 
decision launched by Spencer Roane and others who accused Marshall of being a 
consolidationist or “unified nationalist.”   Newmyer also examines Marshall‟s nine essays 
written in response under the nom de plume “A Friend of the Constitution,” and 
articulates the fascinating argument that Marshall was actually a prudent two levels of 
government man defending the Constitution against rabid states‟s righters.  According to 
Newmyer, “what Marshall assumed he was doing was reaffirming the wisdom of the 
While President from 1809-1817, Madison was concerned that the Constitution was 
becoming whatever the Congress said it was.  In other words, the distinction between 
statutory law and fundamental law was being undermined.  Thus he vetoed the Bonus 
Bill in 1817, which, ironically, would have provided the infrastructure for the commercial 
republic recommended in Federalist 10. Even though he signed the Second Bank Bill into 
law, and thus actually agreed with the core of Marshall‟s decision in McCulloch, 
Madison nevertheless considered Marshall‟s “latitudinary mode of expounding the 
Constitution,” to be disturbing.  This wasn‟t primarily an example of the judiciary 
endorsing a constitutional tradition based on a thirty-year “liquidation” process.  Rather, 
Madison saw Marshall‟s argument as breaking new and dangerous ground.  To invite 
Congress to completely own the meaning of the necessary and proper clause, said 
Madison in 1819, is to severe any direct connection between ends and means, and to 
eliminate any distinction between expediency and constitutionality.
18
  
Put differently, Marshall, despite his protestations in his essays defending the decision, 
which included deferential remarks to the Framers, opened the door to the doctrine 
“unitary nationalism,” and he did so without appeal to the actual intent of the Framers.  
Instead he seemed to appeal to the logical intent of the Framers.  The high-ground 
position is, I think, that like Hamilton, Marshall is interested in the establishment of good 
government and not just free government. But the establishment of free government 
depends on limiting the means and not only the ends.  It may seem to be absurd to do so, 
but that is why so many of the Framers themselves were concerned about the 
enumeration of powers as a sign of limitation of powers and not just a grant of powers. 
    C:  Cohens v. Virginia  
The fifth case
19
 to cite The Federalist is Cohens v. Virginia, 1821, in which Virginia 
argued that a sovereign state could not be sued against its will. Marshall argued that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Framers,” p. 345.  To demonstrate that McCulloch defended “two governments,”—or the 
doctrine of divided sovereignty-- and not one consolidated government, Marshall “cited 
one of their own.  Now it was not just Marshall against Roane, but James Madison, too, 
who said in Federalist 39 that the Constitution „is neither a national, nor a federal 
constitution; but a composition of both,‟” pp. 348-349. This is good stuff, even 
Madisonian stuff.  The problem is that it does not leap out at you in the decision and it is 
the decision, rather than the exchange that is read by future generations.  Gerald Gunther, 
ed., John Marshall‟s Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland, Stanford University Press, 
1969, contains Marshall‟s essays in defense of McCulloch as well as those of Roane et al 
who criticized the decision. 
18
 Marvin Myers, The Mind of the Founder, University Press of NewEngland, 1981, 
pp.458-469.  See also Drew McCoy, The Last of the Founders, Cambridge University 
Press, 1989.  
19
 The third case to cite The Federalist was Houston v. Moore, 1820.  Justice Bushrod 
Washington wrote the opinion of the Court and provided the first reference to the 
Judiciary essays in The Federalist, namely, number 82 on concurrent judicial jurisdiction 
Article three granted the federal courts jurisdiction where a state was a party to a case or 
controversy.   
Marshall issues the praises cited above by Faulkner as substantiating the critical 
compatibility between The Federalist and Marshall in this decision.  The long, 
unidentified—it actually comes from Hamilton‟s Federalist 82-- and favorable citation 
concerns an understanding of the extent of federal appellate jurisdiction.  But even here, 
the reliance on The Federalist is made conditional.  Just prior to the favorable citation, 
Marshall expresses his support for contemporaneous exposition:  “Great weight has 
always been attached, and very rightly attached, to contemporaneous exposition.”  And 
this case, says Marshall, is one of those occasions in which great weight should be 
attached to The Federalist because “these essays having been published while the 
constitution was before the nation for adoption or rejection, and having been written in 
answer to objections founded entirely on the extent of its powers, and on its diminution of 
State sovereignty, are entitled to the more consideration where they frankly avow that the 
power objected to is given, and defend it.”  (Emphasis added.)  So despite his 
endorsement of The Federalist as “a complete commentary on our constitution,” the 
complete commentary may, or may not, be the correct commentary. In this case they  
“are entitled to the more consideration;” presumably there are other cases where they will 
be entitled to the less consideration. 
Right after the long and favorable citation of The Federalist, Marshall cites another 
contemporaneous source:  “A contemporaneous exposition of the constitution, certainly 
                                                                                                                                                 
with respect to federal and state courts.  (David Currie notes that this is our first 
encounter with Washington even though he had been on the Court for over twenty years.  
p.108.) In the same decision, Joseph Story wrote a dissenting opinion in which he 
referred to Federalist 32, also written by Hamilton.  This is the second time that The 
Federalist had been cited in dissent and the first of only two times that Story would cite 
The Federalist.  The same year, Story cited Federalist 42 in his opinion for the Court in 
U.S. v. Smith.  “It has been very justly observed,” said Story, “in a celebrated 
commentary, that the definition of piracies might have been left without inconvenience to 
the law of nations, though a legislative definition of them is to be found in most 
municipal codes.”  Not exactly a celebration of first principles! This was the first of only 
five cases in which the Court cited an essay in The Federalist written by Madison. Both 
Thompson and Trimble cited Madison‟s Federalist essay number 44, in opinions for the 
Court in Ogden v. Saunders, 1827. In the other Framer Cases to cite The Federalist, 
Justice Thompson predominated. Thompson cited the essays in Brown v. Maryland, 
1827, Weston v. Charleston, 1829, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 1831, joined by 
Baldwin.  In Wheaton v. Peters, 1834, Thompson cited The Federalist 32, 42, and 43 in 
dissent.  Along the way, in Weston, Marshall provided his third and final citation of The 
Federalist in his opinion of the Court where he reiterates the citation from McCulloch v. 
Maryland. Of all the constitutional cases considered by the Marshall Court, Ogden 
generated the largest number of separate opinions thus deviating from the Marshallian 
plan to have the Court speak with one voice. 
of not less authority than that which has just been cited, is the judiciary act itself.”  
(Emphasis added.)  With respect to the power of the judiciary, then, Marshall places the 
First Congress on a position “of not less authority” than The Federalist.  His reasoning 
deserves full citation:  “We know than in the Congress which passed the act were many 
eminent members of the Convention which formed the constitution.  Not a single 
individual so far as is known, supposed that part of the act which gives the Supreme 
Court appellate jurisdiction over the judgments of the State courts in the cases therein 
specified, to be unauthorized by the constitution.”  Matter settled.20 
But as we shall see, the First Congress made up of the same eminent members didn‟t 
think that bestowing original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue a mandamus was 
unauthorized by the constitution. Marshall, eighteen years earlier in Marbury, said that it 
was unconstitutional and in doing so, he neglected to even refer to the records of the First 
Congress.  In Cohens, however, the actions of the First Congress are critical.  Here he 
says that Virginia‟s claim that the Supreme Court could not hear Cohens because it was 
an appellate case and not a case of original jurisdiction is erroneous.  The men of the First 
Congress knew what they were doing. Are we left with the notion that with respect to 
Section 25 of the Act, the Cohens section, the members of the First Congress knew what 
they were doing but concerning Section 13 of the Act, the Marbury section, they didn‟t 
know what they were doing?
21
 
IV:   Back to the Beginning Again:  Marbury v. Madison  Revisited 
What exactly is going on in Marbury v Madison and how does that decision relate to the 
other landmark cases of the Marshall Court? 
 
Was it about partisan politics?  I think we are all better off putting to the margins the 
contentions of Edwin Corwin and Albert Beveridge that Marshall was a shrewd politician 
who engaged in “calculated audacity.” 22 Of course politics was involved in the 
background although there some dispute about how to resolve the complexities.  We do 
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 Newmyer states Marshall‟s argument thus:  “the Supreme Court provided for in Article 
3, it followed inexorably, was inseparable from the supreme law provided for in Article 
6. The Founding Fathers, wise from the experience of the Articles of Confederation 
period, deliberately made it that way; „contemporaneous expositions,‟ verified their 
intent.  Chief among contemporaneous expositions of the intent of the Framers, standing 
right alongside The Federalist, was the Judiciary Act of 1789, most particularly Section 
25.”  (Emphasis added.) P. 373. 
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 Although, Marshall is cautious, about citing The Federalist in support of the doctrine of 
national supremacy, he does go to considerable lengths to locate the decision within the 
contemporaneous context of the American Founding.  But he does so by focusing on the 
logic of the constitutional text and noting without citation that this is what the 
Constitutional Convention intended and the people ratified. 
22
 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall:  The Building of the Nation, 1815-
1835, 4 vols., Beard Group, 2002 and John Marshall, Chelsea House Publishing, 1984.  
See also Edward Corwin, John Marshall and the Constitution:  A Chronicle of the 
Supreme Court, Indipublish.Com, 2002. 
know that lame-duck President John Adams, with the advise and consent of the Senate, 
named 42 justices for five years and that then Secretary of State, John Marshall failed to 
deliver Marbury‟s Commission on time.  And that the Jeffersonians had made several 
changes in the Judiciary Act. But more was at stake than short run partisan gain. These 
“expediency” and “coup d‟etat” arguments suggest that Marshall did what he had to do in 
order to secure the Federalist Party cause.  This interpretation, in effect, solves the 
complications of Marbury by denying that anything principled was taking place.
23
  Again, 
the other landmark decisions were not completely free of a turbulent political context and 
these later decisions provoked much debate. But I do not think we learn very much about 
Marshallian jurisprudence and its connection to the American Founding my pursuing this 
line of argument. 
 
Was Marbury about the establishment of judicial review?  After all, the phrase judicial 
review does not appear in the Constitution.  But the problem with this claim is this:  the 
phrase judicial review does not appear in Marbury!
24
  So it is difficult, simply at the level 
of terminology, to claim that Marbury established judicial review.  But on a substantive 
level, the right and duty of the Court to review acts of the legislature was agreed to on 
three separate occasions at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and it was understood 
to extend to non-political, or strictly judicial, cases.  The Antifederalist Brutus argued that 
the “equity” language of Article III of the Constitution was an invitation to the judiciary 
to establish judicial supremacy by means of judicial review.  And Hamilton, in response 
in Federalist 78, explicitly denied that judicial review would lead to judicial supremacy.  
He defended judicial review on the ground that “a limited constitution” required the 
judiciary to declare unconstitutional an act of the legislature that violated “the manifest 
tenor” of the Constitution.  Marshall himself, in the Virginia Ratifying Convention of 
1788, stated that if the federal legislature passed a law “not warranted by any of the 
powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the 
Constitution which they are to guard.  They would consider such a law as coming under 
their jurisdiction.  They would declare it void.”  Madisonian Originalism, even 
Hamiltonian Originalism, supports this position.  Even Jefferson accepted the legitimacy 
of judicial review in 1788.  In response to Jefferson‟s request that a Bill of Rights be 
included in the Constitution, Madison asked:  How are these rights to be secured? 
Jefferson responded that the federal judiciary would secure these rights.  
 
If partisan politics and judicial review are not the driving forces undergirding Marbury 
what then is going on here?  Newmyer suggests that Marbury is about establishing the 
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 The arguments of Charles F. Hobson, editor of The Papers of John Marshall, Chapel 
Hill, 1974-present, against the expediency and coup arguments are compelling. He 
outlines the political context of the decision in a way that invites the reader to move 
beyond the political context.  See his The Great Chief Justice:  John Marshall and the 
Rule of Law, University of Kansas Press, 1996. 
24
 Matthew Franck has pointed out that the term judicial review is essentially attributable 
to Corwin and is to be found in two articles by him published in the Michigan Law 
Review in 1909 and 1910.   See also Hobson and Newmyer who argue convincingly that 
judicial review was not the issue in Marbury. 
rule of law.  Accordingly, the main issue in the case was not legislative misconduct, but 
denial by the executive of Marbury‟s right to his commission.  There is much to be said 
about the executive focus of the decision, but if protecting the established rights of an 
individual is the essence of Marshallian jurisprudence and thus consistent with principle 
of the regime that we are a government of laws and not of men, then is the Marbury 
decision an aberration?  Are the other landmark cases similarly situated? 
 
If not partisan politics, judicial review, or the rule of law, what is going on in Marbury?   
My high-ground argument is that Marshall decided that it was critical in Marbury to 
establish the premise that the Constitution did not belong to the Congress and/or the 
President. Both in Marbury and in the other leading cases we have examined, Marshall 
determined that it was the role of the Judiciary to protect the Constitution from the 
partisan activities of the states as well as the Congress and the Executive, In doing so, 
however, he opened up the possibility that the meaning of the Constitution is what the 
Court says it is.  That is the lesson of the thirty-year journey through the Marshall Court.  
 
V:  The Three Parts of Marbury 
 
1) In Marbury v. Madison, Marshall relies exclusively, in the first part of his opinion, on 
the specific language of the Constitution.  He agreed with counsel that under the 
administration of John Adams, Marbury had been properly nominated by the then 
President and properly confirmed by the then United States Senate in accordance with 
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution for a federal judicial appointment.  Thus, he was 
constitutionally “an officer of the United States.”  According to Article II, section 3, 
continues Marshall, the President “shall Commission all the officers of the United 
States.”  This means, in practice, that the Secretary of State, shall deliver the commission.  
Even though the commission was not delivered by the then Secretary of State during the 
tenure of the Adams administration, Marshall ruled that neither the newly elected 
President Jefferson, nor the newly appointed Secretary of State Madison, had “the 
executive discretion” to withhold the commission.  In this matter, Madison had merely a 
“magisterial,” and not a “political” status. 
  
2) In the second part of his opinion, Marshall also appeals to the specific language of the 
Constitution.  Although a mandamus indeed should be issued to order the delivery of 
Marbury‟s Commission, states Marshall, the Supreme Court is constitutionally unable to 
issue that order.  According to Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, “the Supreme 
Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting [1] ambassadors, [2] other 
public ministers and consuls, and [3] those in which a state shall be a party.  In all other 
cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.”  (Emphasis added.)  To 
Marshall, the language of the Constitution imposes a maximum of three instances where 
the Supreme Court can exercise original jurisdiction.  Since the authority to issue a 
mandamus is not specifically enumerated in the original jurisdiction clause, the Supreme 
Court does not have the constitutional ability to issue a mandamus.  That part of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorizes the Supreme Court “to issue writs of mandamus 
in cases warranted by principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons 
holding office, under the authority of the United States,” is, thus, unconstitutional. 
 Marshall‟s message is clear: We live under a “written constitution,” and the very 
language of that document expressly places a written limitation not only on Congress, but 
also on the Executive and the Judiciary.  Congress must conform to the language of the 
Constitution when passing laws, the Executive must conform to the language when 
executing the law, and so too must the Judiciary when it exercise its judicial function.  
“The fundamental and paramount law of the nation,” limits the power of all 3 branches of 
the federal government to the language of the written constitution.  Judicial review is not 
only compatible with a written constitution, but derives its very legitimacy from it. At 
this stage of the argument, Marshall invokes the work of the Framers:  he states that his 
understanding of written constitutionalism conforms “to the solicitude of the 
convention,” and “all those who have formed written constitutions.”    
 
 This again is good Madisonian stuff.  But having taken the long journey to the Marshall 
Court, I am no longer as innocent on my return to back where we started. 
 
First, the language of Article III is not as clearly prohibitive as Marshall makes it out to 
be, and certainly doesn‟t unambiguously support Marshall‟s interpretation.  Prior to 
discriminating between original and appellate jurisdiction, Article III bestows on 
Congress the authority to develop the structure of the courts and to install proper judicial 
procedures.  The Framers did not think that it was appropriate for a Constitution to spell 
out all the operational details; thus it was left to Congress to fill in the details of Article 
III. Moreover, Congress was granted the power to make “exceptions” with respect to the 
bestowing of appellate jurisdiction. 
 
Second, making the Court a functional part of constitutional politics was precisely what 
the First Congress did: they passed the Judiciary Act, one part of one section of which 
dealt with the power of the Court to issue a writ of mandamus in certain specific 
situations.  As Marshall observed in Cohens v. Virginia, 1821, The First Congress 
contained many members who had served in the Constitutional Convention, including 
Madison, and the spectre of violating the principles of a written constitution never 
haunted the discussions of the Judiciary Act.  What Marshall calls “the solicitude of the 
convention” was in fact identical to what we might call “the solicitude of the First 
Congress.”  Here Marshall did not seek any assistance from the records of the First 
Congress. He simply ignored them. If Representative Madison, who supported the 
mandamus provision in the 1789 Act, thought it violated the doctrine of limited 
government, he certainly kept it to himself.  Madisonian Constitutionalism does indeed 
require that the Court declare unconstitutional those acts of Congress, and by implication 
Executive actions, that are palpable, dangerous, and obvious violations of the 
Constitution; there should be a respectable deference, but not an obsequious pandering, to 
the Congress and to the Presidency.
25
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 David P. Currie quoting Albert Beveridge observes “that all of Marshall‟s arguments 
had been rehearsed in the congressional debate over the repeal of the Judiciary Act in 
1801, The Constitution in The Supreme Court, The First Hundred Years, 1798-1888, 
University of Chicago Press, p. 70. 
 Third, although Madison did not write any of the judicial essays in The Federalist, he 
would concur with Hamilton‟s “manifest tenor” argument for judicial review.  In 
Federalist, 78, Hamilton argued that the role of the Court, under a “limited constitution,” 
is to declare unconstitutional those acts of Congress that violate “the manifest tenor” of 
the Constitution. Hamilton gives two examples:  Congress is constitutionally barred from 
passing bills of attainder and ex-post facto laws.  If the Congress does engage in these 
constitutionally prohibitive activities, it is the duty of the Court to declare them 
unconstitutional.  Clearly there is “an irreconconcilable variance” here between an act of 
the legislature and the Constitution.  So the Madison-Hamilton tests in Marbury would be 
these:  did either the Congress or the newly elected Executive violate the “manifest tenor” 
of the Constitution when the Congress bestowed original jurisdiction to issue a 
mandamus and when the Executive refused to issue a commission to Marbury?   Do we 
have “an irreconcilable variance” taking place? 
 
Fourth, I do not mean that Madisonianism would require, therefore, that Marshall issue a 
mandamus to Madison in 1803 because the Judiciary Act was, Marshall to the contrary 
notwithstanding, actually constitutional. To be sure, Madison was a person holding office 
under the authority of the United States, and thus covered by the “issuing clause” of the 
Judiciary Act.  But the “ operative clause” of the Act, states that a mandamus is 
authorized only “in cases warranted by principles and usages of law.”  Relying on 
language alone, one might ask whether Marbury‟s request met this test.  On Madisonian 
grounds, Marshall could have ruled that the Judiciary Act was constitutional and still not 
have issued a mandamus requiring Madison to deliver the commission.  
 
Fifth, there is nothing in the language of the Constitution per se that makes it crystal clear 
that Jefferson and Madison had been reduced from political actors to magisterial conduits 
in the case of Marbury‟s commission. Why is it unambiguously clear by the language of 
the Constitution, that a newly elected President, and a newly appointed Secretary of State, 
should be compelled to deliver a judicial commission signed by a previous President and 
undelivered by a former Secretary of State?  In fact, Article III states unambiguously that 
judicial appointments are outside the control of the judiciary and is a matter to be dealt 
with by the Senate and the President.   
 
Sixth, why is it the province of the judiciary to make the distinction between what is a 
judicial and what is a political question?  Just because Marshall says that this is a judicial 
matter and that he is not meddling in Presidential affairs doesn‟t mean that this is a 
judicial matter and that he is not meddling in Presidential affairs.  Again, I suggest that it 
was possible to uphold the constitutionality of the Judiciary Act, on Madisonian grounds, 
and at the same time not issue the mandamus:  the mandamus wasn‟t warranted in this 
case and the issue was political rather than judicial.   
 
3) But there is third and final feature of Marshall‟s argument that makes it at least 
possible for him to be claimed as the father of the central principle of non-originalism.  
Toward the end of Marbury v. Madison, Marshall announces, rather unexpectedly given 
his previous remarks linking judicial review with judicial restraint that “it is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This bold remark 
comes out of nowhere and is uttered after the mandamus matter has been decided and the 
case put to rest.  What really makes me edgy is this:  Earlier, Marshall called the 
constitution, the “paramount law of the nation,”  (emphasis added) which constrained 
every branch of government including the judiciary.  Here, he says it is the duty of the 
judiciary “to say what the law is.”  Marshall can‟t possibly mean that since the paramount 
law is a law then the written constitution, the paramount law, is what the judiciary says it 
is.  Or can he be saying this?   Marshall continues:  “ if two laws conflict with each other, 
the courts must decide on the operation of each,” because “this is of the very essence of 
judicial duty.” Doesn‟t Marshall leave us with the impression that the Supreme Court is 
the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution? 
 
  VI:  Conclusion:  Judging the Marshall Court and Original Intent 
Marbury, although 200 years old, is adequately propped up by two life support systems.  
Both originalists and non-originalists, want to have a living Marbury. The originalists see 
Marbury, and the decisions of the Marshall Court, as a reaffirmation of the principles of 
the American Founding and, also, presenting a sensible alternative to current non-
originalist jurisprudence.  On the other hand, the non-originalists see Marbury, and the 
decisions of the Marshall Court, as establishing the independence and supremacy of the 
Court.  Moreover, independence is to be understood as independence from the American 
Founding and supremacy is portrayed as the owner of the Constitution.   
 
My conclusion, based on my empirical and normative journey to the Marshall Court, is 
that those who wish to maintain a decent respect for the principles of the American 
founding need to face up to the fact that Marbury, and the decisions of the Marshall 
Court, sowed the seeds for the separation of the Framers of the Constitution from the 
Framers of the Court.  If originalism means an attachment to a balance between the 
nation and the states, a balance between the branches of the general government, and an 
attachment to the teaching that the Constitution not only articulates the ends but also 
limits the means to those ends, then Marshallian jurisprudence raises serious challenges 
to these principles.  In many ways, McCulloch, Fletcher, and Cohen, are living proof of 
An Originalists‟s Nightmare, a nightmare that has its origins in Marbury and its 
fulfillment in the later decisions. 
 
Prior to the journey, I had been moved by Christopher Wolfe‟s critique that a non-
orginalist interpretation of Marshall is simply “amazing.”26  Robert Lowry Clinton has 
recently built on this Wolfe‟s distinction between Marshallian jurisprudence and the 
twentieth century variety that suggests that the Constitution is what the Supreme Court 
says it is.   At the heart of Clinton‟s case is that “ no exclusive power to interpret the 
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 See Wolfe‟s The Rise of Modern Judicial Review:  From Constitutional Interpretation 
to Judge-Made Law, New York, 1986.  Like Faulkner, Wolfe locates Marshall within the 
context of the American Founding and distinguishes his jurisprudence from that of the 
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fundamental law is claimed for the Court…in Marbury.” 27  Marshall‟s  “silence” on 
exclusive judicial superiority is interpreted by Clinton to mean that “there is no denial [by 
Marshall] of the legislature‟s power to do likewise [„look into the Constitution‟].”  Put 
differently, Clinton claims that Marshall is an originalist because he rejects the notion of 
judicial supremacy; instead Marshall supports the idea that each branch has the power to 
look into the Constitution. “That is made clear a few paragraphs later in the opinion:  „It 
is apparent, that the Framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule 
for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature‟” 28 Does this citation support 
Clinton‟s point?  No.  Marshall is saying that a written constitution not only limits the 
legislature, it also limits the courts.  It is not an invitation to the legislature to open up the 
Constitution. It is actually a demand that neither the legislature nor the courts, under the 
Constitution, all branches are limited by the Constitution. 
 
What is troublesome about Clinton‟s rescue of Marshall from the myth of current judicial 
scholarship is that Marbury rejects rather than confirms his contention.  The Congress in 
which Madison was a member did interpret Section 13 of the Judiciary Act to be a 
constitutional exercise of power; Marshall said the power was not constitutional.  And the 
Presidency, of which Madison was a member, did interpret its power to deliver the 
commission as constitutional; Marshall said the power was not constitutional. Put 
differently, Marbury, albeit in the name of the rule of law, denies the power of the 
legislature and the executive to do likewise. 
 
Really disturbing is Marshall‟s swift move from judicial obligation to judicial sight 
seeing.  It is “too extravagant to be maintained,” he fumed, “that the intention of those 
who gave” the judicial power was that “the constitution should not be looked into.”  A 
citation from the Founding debates would help, but Marshall offers none.  Logical 
intention strikes again.  Marshall seems to be saying that the Framers would support the 
justices looking into the Constitution?  But what does “look into” the Constitution mean?   
 
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall said that the Framers “ must be understood …to have 
intended what they said.”  Accordingly, he concluded, we know what they intended “by 
the language” of the Constitution.  Marshall shifts the interpretative focus from 
understanding the language of the Constitution in light of the intentions of the Framers to 
understanding the intentions of the Framers in light of the language of the Constitution.  
But how do we understand the language of the Constitution?  In McCulloch, Marshall 
says that meaning turns on maxims: If the end is legitimate then the means are necessary 
and proper.  And even if none of the Framers, except perhaps Hamilton, articulated this 
position, then the sheer logic of constitutionalism, federalism, and republicanism shows 
that they should have.  To paraphrase Hamilton in Federalist 23: To concur that the end is 
good and then to be reluctant to grant the means is “absurd.”  It is absurd because it 
violates the very maxims of good government. We may live under the language of the 
Constitution but the Court interprets the language of the Constitution. To interpret the 
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language of the Constitution, for Marshall, but not for Madison, is “ emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department.”  
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